Future+Social+Science+and+the+Invisible+Elbow


 * =Title:         **Future Social Science and the Invisible Elbow (Lemert, pp. 644-647) **= ||   ||
 * =Author: Charles Tilly (1996)= ||  ||
 * =Date: 3.15.11= ||  ||
 * =Summary By: Ela= ||  ||
 * =Summary:=

In this excerpt, Tilly compares causal mechanisms not to an “Invisible Hand” which guides social life in a straightforward, deterministic manner, but to an “Invisible Elbow.” To understand the comparison, imagine that you are closing a door not with your hand, but with your elbow, while holding grocery bags. Sometimes the door closes all the way, sometimes not, sometimes there are unanticipated consequences (e.g. fruit falls out of the grocery bag, you drop the eggs, etc.), and sometimes there are additional contributing factors (e.g. the floor was wet) to the outcome (e.g. so I slipped while trying to close the door.) There are a few key points to draw from this analogy: · We should not think of a single outcome, but of a range of outcomes. This range can further be divided into a range of acceptable outcomes vs. unacceptable outcomes. · In social life, we do not maximize outcomes; we “satisfice” (Herbert Simon) · Social life is full of error, unintended actions, eronneous interactions, and unintended consequences. · Social life is also full of responses, adjustments, and corrections to erroneous action or unintended consequences. · Social science seeks to identify the //range// of //possible// outcomes and then explain outcomes by comparing what //could have// happened to what //did// happen (i.e. comparing the counterfactual to the factual.) · The key is to consider the //range// of causes and the //range// of possibilities. · It is also important to account for social interaction, constraints, error, and responses to error. · Error need not be considered totally random, as it occurs within a historical, social, and cultural context. Social scientists can help explain it by looking at the webs of meaning and social constraints in which it is embedded. ||  ||
 * =Discussion points:=

· Tilly’s approach requires imagining counterfactuals. One can imagine that one set of counterfactuals may be too narrowly imagined, while another may cast the net too wide. We can count on peer reviewers to tell us when we’ve left out an important counterfactual from our explanation, but how do we decide at what point the proliferation of counterfactuals has reached absurd proportions? ||  || = = = = = = = = = = = =

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