Modernization,+Cultural+Change,+and+Democracy

** Summary by Suzanne Ghais 10/8/10 ** Ch. 1: This chapter really lays out the argument of the whole book. The book updates and substantially revises the classical theories of modernization (Marx, Weber), based on two decades of opinion-polling research in a range of countries comprising 85% of the world’s population. The authors set forth economic conditions as the major driver of cultural, social, and political change (though economy is not deterministic--leadership, institutions, etc. play a role). Whereas earlier modernization--the shift from pre-industrial to industrial--brought one set of changes (shift of authority from religious to secular elites & institutions, and “rationalization, centralization, and bureaucratization” [p. 46]), the shift from industrial to post-industrial economies brings a whole different slew of changes, because there is no more fear about basic survival //and// the knowledge/service economy rewards individual autonomy and creativity. The resulting changes include higher education and cognitive abilities that lead one to question authority, more of a search for self-expression, social values that are more permissive of non-traditional lifestyles, a shift from institutional religion to more individual quests for spiritual meaning, a concern for risks that are more abstract (like global warming or genetically modified foods) rather than existential (like starving to death), and greater demands for political participation. Political participation, though, shifts from party-driven and elite-driven (which dominates in the industrial period) to more individual, issue-specific mobilization. The authors argue that these patterns are global, but that they do not represent cultural homogenization, westernization, or Americanization. In fact, they have identified clusters of similar cultures and seen that they retain their cultural distinctiveness very robustly over time. They also argue, drawing on data from former Soviet states, that it is not education levels per se which drive the cultural changes but rather the underlying economic security. When economic security plummeted after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a shift backwards in this trajectory to more traditional values, even though education levels did not reverse. (They’ll elaborate on this in a future chapter.) Ch. 2: This chapter presents detailed survey evidence in support of the seemingly contradictory propositions that economic development brings about major cultural and values shifts //and// that cultural distinctiveness endures over time. On the first point, a plot of 80 countries divided into high, middle, and low income (per capita GDP) shows that low income correlates with traditional values (like feeling religion is very important, and making sacrifices for one’s children and parents) and survival values (like being dissatisfied with one’s financial situation, and valuing a safe job over a rewarding one), whereas high income correlates with the opposites: secular-rational values and self-expression values (see plot p. 57). More specifically, societies go from traditional to more secular-rational with the transition from agrarian to industrial economy (another great plot p. 59), and they go from survival to self-expression values with the rise of a service economy (plot p. 61). On the second point--the persistence of cultural distinctiveness--the plot on p. 63, using the same axes (traditional v. secular-rational on the vertical axis, survival v. self-expression on the horizontal) shows how major cultural “zones” (such as Latin America, Protestant Europe, South Asia) form pretty coherent blobs on the diagram, and the authors say this has remained the case over the many years of their research. Religion, history of colonialism, and history of communism are reflected in the clustering.[1] The mapping (same one, p. 63) shows that cultural grouping exerts an //independent// effect--it is not purely a matter of economic development level. Further exploring the cultural groupings, even though the broad groupings of countries are done partly on religious grounds, the differences between //nations// are much larger than the differences between //religious groups within nations//, suggesting national culture, though influenced by religious factors, is more important than religion itself. “Despite widespread talk of the globalization of culture, the nation [well, I would say the state --SG] remains a key unit of shared experience, with its educational and cultural institutions shaping the values of almost everyone in that society” (p. 69). Similarly, the differences between income groups within each country are smaller than the overall differences between countries.
 * Inglehart & Welzel’s //Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence// (2005), Chapters 1-5 **

[1] Interesting tidbit: The “United States is a deviant case, having a much more traditional value system than any other postindustrial society except Ireland. On the traditional/secular dimension, the United States ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable with those found in some developing societies….The United States does rank among the most advanced societies on the survival/self-expression dimension, but even here, it does not lead the world…. Clearly, modernization is not Americanization” (p. 65).

Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Chapters 7-13 10/07/10, Annie Gillman · Modernization theory, which predicts a connection between socioeconomic status and the emergence of democracy, is correct. The intermediary variable, however, is the “self-expression” value. As countries get richer, and people’s material survival is no longer such a concern, they will begin to put more value on “self-expression.” As such, they will demand the institutions and political structures that allow for the highest form of human autonomy, which is democracy. He counters supposed exceptions to this rule (Weimar republic) but admits some others (India.) · There is a difference between //formal// and //effective// democracy. Formal democracy (consisting of the structures—elections, constitution, etc) can be imposed, but //effective// democracy has to come from the ground up, and can only be possible if there is a societal wide valuing of “self-expression.” · “Self-expression” values precede, and are a precondition for, democracy. This counters elite-centered determinism and institutional-focused determinism theories that democracies are created through the right institutional arrangements of enlightened elites, and that by ”habituation”—aka living within these structures and adapting to them—people will come to appreciate and accept self-expression values. On the contrary, it is the mass acceptance of self-expression values that pushes people to clamor for democracy, and empirically one can show that mass self-expression values are present in societies years before the transition to democracy occurs. · He also considers theories that emphasize the role of international context and collective actors. He notes that changes in international context can “unblock the impact of social forces rooted in mass self-expression values” but cannot create these values. With regards to collective action theories, he notes that all democracy is overcoming collective action problems, but these theories miss the motivational aspect of why societies then do so to adopt democracy. · Political culture literature suggests a number of values that are key to the creation and maintenance of democracy, such as faith in public institutions, membership in associations, and norm abidingness. He argues that self-expression values are the most important, even over surveyed support for democracy (which can be inflated by “lip service” people give to what they consider a socially acceptable form of government). · As self-expression values are manifest in society, gender equality improves. This is just one example of how self-expression values drive people not only selfishly to push for their own emancipation, but also for the emancipation of others, suggesting that modernization is not just a materialistic process, but rather a humanistic process, whereby people, when there material needs are met, put for greater human autonomy overall, including for their fellow humans.