Corporatism+in+Perspective+An+Introductory+Guide+to+Corporatist+Theory

Note: We only have to read Chapter 10 of this book, but take a look at the first section of Chapter 1 (also on blackboard) in order to have even the foggiest notion of what he’s talking about. The key flaws it sees in the pluralist view are (a) assuming a rough equivalence of influence among citizens and different interests within society, (b) assuming that leaderships of organizations are beholden to their members, (c) assuming the state is essentially a neutral democratic set of institutions, and (d) assuming that there are opportunities for participation in interest group politics. The rest of the chapter is less important – outlines key debates and the ‘generations’ of corporatist thought. The ‘general model of corporatism’ (p.223-4) is a already a very clear summary of the chapter, so I will present it as it is written but add notes wherever it makes sense. // ‘1. Corporatism is concerned [with restructuring] the relationship between producers, producers’ associations, and the state to significantly shift the balance of influence in negotiations over intervention into production in favor of the state.’ // This is not saying that corporatists actively try to restructure this relationship, but that they see the relationship differently than do pluralists: specifically, they see producer groups as being very powerful, but the state as being even more powerful. The state must take this stance in order to offset the imbalance that would otherwise leave them reliant on producers. // ‘2. Through the attribution of public status to interest associations, the state establishes a basis upon which to license the behavior of interest associations’ // Corporatism is primarily concerned between the relationship between the state and producers, though theoretically the model might also extend to consumer groups. This relationship is based on (1) producer associations becoming reliant on the state, and (2) individual producers becoming reliant on the producers associations. The first step happens when the group becomes reliant on the resources it is granted by the state – this gives the state the ability to shape the association’s actions, and thus to a distortion of the association’s ability to represent its members interests. The second step is ensured through mechanisms (3) and (4), which ensure that individual producers must obey the association (hierarchical command structure), and must remain under its control, even when it is no longer representing the interests of the majority of producers (because it is a monopoly or because it provides services necessary for production).
 * Williamson, Peter J. (1989), //Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory.// Chapter 10: Corporatism in Perspective: a General Model and a Final Assessment. London: SAGE Publications.**
 * Chapter 1** outlines what the corporatist model is and how it fits into the literature. The key question is what the role of organized interest groups is vis-a-vis the state and society in liberal democracies. Corporatism pits itself against the ‘conventional’/’pluralist’ model which holds that these interest groups can be a positive mechanism whereby citizens can interact directly with the state. Corporatism challenges this, and takes a less benign view of interest groups. It holds that they can have a regulatory rather than representative role; that they can reinforce rather than merely reflect socio-economic inequalities; and that they can be used by states to promote stability and intervention.
 * Chapter 10** is a conclusion of the rest of the book, and tries to tie together all the key themes in order to build a model of corporatism. Williamson highlights that the goal is not to determine whether a state is or is not corporatist or whether corporatist arrangements do or do not exist in aggregate. Instead, it is about ‘establishing how far the state seeks to, and can, overcome its dependency on producers which poses a potentially serious challenge to its economic and ultimately political role.’ (222). The chapter ends with a ‘guide to further reading’ that I will not summarize – but if the subject fascinates you, check page 225.

//‘3. Power within interest organizations is hierarchical, so that authority flows downwards with the leadership enjoying some position of ‘command’ over the members to ensure compliance to the ‘unrepresentative bargains’ they reach with the state’//

//‘4. To ensure that the members of interest associations cannot escape the confines of state-dependent and hierarchical associations and seek representation through a more truly reprehensive association, and that associations do not have to compete with each other on grounds of effectiveness of representation, which would challenge their hierarchical nature, the structure and characteristics of interest representation are as follows: (a) Through monopolization or other means the removal of access for producers to effective associations other than those which are dependent upon the state and hierarchically structured.// //(b) Through the provision by associations to producers of services essential to the productive process, or other means, membership for a substantial part of the constituency must in effect be compulsory.’//

// ‘5. Interest associations have a role to play in ensuring compliance with interventions bargained between them and the state’ // Because of the above, interest groups gain a privileged position in mediating between the state and producers. ‘6. Beyond a role in ensuring compliance with the interventions, associations can assume a variety of roles in the implementation of public policy, and the more such a role is handed over from state agencies to associations, the more developed, other things being equal, is the form of corporatism.’ I.e. where we see states devolving greater amounts of power to associations, we can describe the system as more corporatist. //‘Where interest associations perform a major role in implementing public policies, there will need to be either compulsory membership for those who are to be subject to regulation, or authority delegated from the state to the association so that it can regulate non-members and members alike.//’ ‘7. In certain instances, instead of organizing producers into intermediary associations, there may be attempts to ‘disorganize’ producers so that they are less able to oppose regulatory powers delegated to private associations.’ This is in line with Corporatism’s ‘less benign’ view of associations – they may sometimes act purely to enhance their own power, even to the detriment of those they purport to represent. Corporatists also take a ‘less benign’ view of the state: ‘//the state under corporatism is a structure of domination which encompasses interests that seek to maintain the existing social order against the behaviour of producers which are inimical to the maintenance of that order’// (217). //‘8. Corporatist arrangements can pertain to intervention into the economy as a whole (macro), intervention into individual sectors of markets (meso), and into the individual firm (micro). In addition, corporatist arrangements can occur around the provision of welfare services (welfare corporatism).// This is just a ‘levels of analysis’ question within the discipline. ‘9. Corporatism is associated with a political dualism, which entails certain interests – essentially major producer interests – being afforded privileged access whereby their compliance to interventionist policies is ‘bought’ at the expense of other interests which are excluded from such access, and where the electoral channels of representation have diminished in importance. Privileged access may not be equally afforded under corporatism because of the different power that different producers can mobilize.’ Corporatism both excludes and includes – but does more of the former. Most citizens are not represented by corporatist arrangements, and many of those who are only receive a limited share of the benefits.