Feminism+and+the+question+of+postmodernism

Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism ||  || Seyla Benhabib ||  || 1992 ||  || Kate ||   || Basic premise: feminism and postmodernism (in its most extreme form) are incompatible. Although feminism has gained valuable insights from postmodernism, and can effectively draw on the “weak version” of postmodernism, the “strong version” implies too much moral ambiguity and is unwilling to stake out a solid normative stance. This is impossible to integrate with a feminist project where envisioning a better less oppressive world is a fundamental part of the game. Benhabib starts by tracing the roots of three critiques of the modern project that eventually grew into what we now think of as postmodernism. 1. The critique of the modern epistemic subject a. This starts with Marx and Horkheimer, who say that a person’s perceptions are not just viewed from a distance as a spectator. Instead, they build a model of “an active, producting fabricating humanity, creating the conditions of objectivity by forming nature through its own historical activity.” This is continued by Freud who recognizes that the self is “not master in its own house.” 2. The critique of the modern epistemic object a. She traces this back to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer. Nietzsche brings into question the idea of a mind/body dualism. Adorno and Horkheimer write that “conceptual” thought requires domination over the subject of the concept: “the Enlightenment relates to things as the dictator to humans” 3. The critique of the modern concept of the sign a. Saussure, Pierce, Frege and Wittgensteing argue that an individual does not create their own terms to represent what they perceive in the world, but that language is inherently social and a group construct. Lyotard develops his postmodernist theories largely out of the third stream of critique, and argues that there can only be local and context-specific criteria of validity. Language games are playfully antagonistic. “This cognitive option yields a ‘polytheism of values,’ and a politics of justice beyond consensus” (543). The three critiques above are then paralleled with three critiques identified by Jane Flax as “the death of Man, History, and Metaphysics” (543). Behabib summarizes each of these arguments, then presents a strong and a weak version of each argument, claiming that while the weaker version may be compatible with feminism, the stronger version is not, as the “undermine the possibility of normative criticism at large.” 1. Death of man = “Demystification of the Male Subject of Reason” a. Weak version: situates the subject in the context of discursive practices b. Strong version: “the subject is merely another position in language” (545), and the subject becomes sucked into the context that constitutes it, with no remaining moral ground to stand on – everything becomes relative. She draws this tension to light by asking “how we must understand the phrase: ‘the I although constituted by discourse is not determined by it’” (548). Benhabib thinks its important to retain the moral grounding of feminist claims. 2. Death of history = “Engendering of Historical Narrative” a. Weak version: the end of grand narratives – this is largely in relation to critiques of “white, middle-class, heterosexual [women’s theories which] dominated the beginnings of the second wave” (quoting Linda Nichoson, 549) in favor of more contextualized and context-specific theories that took working class women’s, lesbians’ and women of color’s perspectives into account. b. Strong version: “a prima facie rejection of any historical narrative that concerns itself with the long duree and that focuses on macro- rather than on micro-social practices” (549). But Benhabib says that it is important for feminist scholars to rewrite history, and this project should not be abandoned. 3. Death of metaphysics = “Feminist Skepticism Toward the Claims of Transcendent Reason” a. The weak version is apparently already to strong in this case. It is based on Rorty’s idea that the project of “epistemology” makes philosophy nothing more than a legitimating discourse, that decides what is legit and what isn’t. Benhabib is not comfortable with tossing out the philosophical basis for any social criticism. You need something bigger to ground and legitimize “local narratives” – these cannot stand on their own. She concludes by arguing that postmodernism has led to a retreat from utopia, and while feminists need not be utopians, they should not lose the “ethical impulse of utopia” although it should be articulated according to “the normative principles of democratic action and organization in the present” (553-4). ||  || Benhabib’s claim seems to boil down to a call for a single unified feminist theory. In the last paragraph she gives away her own political theory driving her argument. She writes that, while the idea that the views of certain feminist scholars, “only articulate the sensitivities of white, middle-class, affluent, first world, heterosexual women may be true (although I even have empirical doubts about this). Yet what are we ready to offer in their place: a s a project of an ethics which should guide us in the future are we able to offer a better vision that the synthesis of autonomous justice thinking and empathetic care?” (554) a) Is a single narrative of any social criticism possible? Desirable? b) How do we find a balance between wishy-washy pomo relativism, and closed-minded preachyness based on any individual’s limited experience? ||  || = = = = = = = = = = = =
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