Revisiting+the+Pathologies+of+Rational+Choice

__Background:__ This article is a defense of an earlier book by the same authors: //Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory// (1996) (in this summary, I’ll call it ‘//Pathologies’)//. The article addresses a variety of criticisms of the earlier book, mainly from pro-RCT (rational choice theory) authors, and counters them with (sometimes slightly salty) retorts. __Main arguments:__ i. ‘Rather than ask ‘What causes X?’, method-driven research begins with the question ‘How might my preferred theoretical or methodological approach account for X?’’ (54) __Outline of the article:__ i. Puzzle is that while rational choice would expect voter turn out (and other forms of voluntary public participation in democratic institutions) to be low, in may cases it is in fact high. i. Response: (a) that these new theories rest on ‘preposterous assumptions’ such as complete information, and that others still fail to ‘accommodate the range of anomalies that run up in the laboratory (b) that the purpose of //Pathologies// was to ‘assess the empirical performance of rational choice theory, not chart its analytic refinements’ (70). i. Response: that these circumstances only apply to small-scale scenarios, but not mass-based action where individual benefits are necessarily tiny. i. //...//overlooks RCT’s value for identifying causal mechanisms 1. Response: that none of the ‘melange of causal mechanisms’ that he suggests ‘inspire confidence in the claims of rational choice theory’ ii. ...fails to offer alternatives to RCT explanations of collective action 1. Response: Just because there are no other theories with the same scope, doesn’t make RCT right, and in fact may point to its flaw in attempting to find universal explanations. iii. ...tries to ‘impose arbitrary rules about the limits of rational choice theory 1. Response: ‘Since Chong seems to believe that everything from conscious calculation to ‘cultural inertia’ may be squared with some variant of rational choice logic... our disagreement becomes largely semantic, and rational choice theory is nothing but an ever-expanding tent in which to house every plausible proposition...’ (76) i. ... poli sci should become more practical and aimed at improving political institutions 1. Response: that motives of scholars vary and normative aspirations are tricky ii. ... social scientists should engage in trial and error engineering 1. Response: this is normatively very problematic, and may even generate self-fulfilling prophecies.
 * Green, Donald, and Ian Sapiro (2005). ‘Revisiting the Pathologies of Rational Choice’. In Ian Shapiro (ed.) //The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences// Princeton: Princeton University Press//.//**
 * 1) RCT has not produced any theories that are both ‘arresting’ (i.e. interesting – would pass the ‘Grandmother test’ of being something your grandma couldn’t come up with) and ‘empirically sustainable’ (i.e. in line with real world facts).
 * 2) ‘The central claim of our book is that very little has been learned by way of nonobvious propositions that withstand empirical scrutiny’ (52)
 * 3) The key flaws of RCT are:
 * 4) That its approach is ‘method-driven’ rather than ‘problem driven’
 * 1) That it has universalistic aspirations that are not appropriate to the social sciences
 * 2) Instead, Green and Shapiro argue that universalistic claims are probably impossible in the social sciences, and researchers should focus their efforts on developing hypothesis level or middle-level generalizations.
 * 1) Intro
 * 2) Although RCT has made great analytical strides, it has added little to the ‘stock of knowledge about politics’ (52).
 * 3) Sets up the main arguments noted above.
 * 4) ‘What has been learned?’
 * 5) Criticism to be addressed: //Pathologies// failed to ‘acknowledge the legitimate empirical accomplishments of rational choice scholarship’
 * 6) Response: Looking at nine examples of rational choice literature, they find that each one either (a) fails to live up to empirical evidence, or (b) if it does live up the empirics, does so by adding so many additional clauses and variables that it isn’t really rational choice any more
 * 7) ‘Collective Action’
 * 8) Criticism to be addressed: The authors of //Pathologies// did not really understand rational choice theory or ‘appreciate its implications for collective action in politics’
 * 1) Lohman (critic) says that the authors have failed to note recent developments in RCT and game theory that can account for mass collective action.
 * 1) Michael Tayor (critic) says that RCT does allow for collective action under certain circumstances (specifics p 71)
 * 1) ‘Comparative statistics and a bit of revisionism’
 * 2) Fiorina (critic) rejects the claim that RCT predicts the breakdown of collective action, and says that RC theorists should look at degrees of change in participation ‘as a consequence of exogenous shifts in the strategic environment.
 * 3) Response: The authors cite Olson as proof that RCT predicts the breakdown of collective action. They then say that Fiorina’s recommendations are their own, and that they too push for ‘partial universalism’ – looking for degrees of change rather than universalistic covering laws, but that RCT scholars don’t like this because it ‘takes much of the air out’ of their predictions.
 * 4) ‘The Pathologies of //Pathologies’//
 * 5) Chong (critic) says that //Pathologies...//
 * 1) ‘Why a little philosophy of science is a dangerous thing’
 * 2) Ferejohn and Satz, Chong, Riorina, and Shepsle (critics) say that Pathologies is weak because it doesn’t offer an alternative – ‘Shepsle’s “First Law of Wingwalking” (“Don’t let do of something until you have something else to hold to”)
 * 3) Response: (a) rational choice has so little clout that it barely counts as a theory to be defeated, (b) RCT scholars don’t look at alternative explanations either, (c) the burden of persuasion of finding an alternative hypothesis does not lie with the person who points out the failure.
 * 4) Respond to the criticism that no theories can be tested empirically, by saying that while theories themselves are not testable, they should generate falsifiable hypotheses that can be tested.
 * 5) ‘Method-driven versus problem-driven research’
 * 6) Method-driven research creates theories that are not empirically sustainable and that therefore fail to contribute to scientific accumulation of knowledge.
 * 7) Universalism ‘fosters’ method-driven research
 * 8) Although its OK to focus only on certain key independent variables and neglect others for the sake of a simpler model, this can lead to ridiculous theories – ex: ‘tall men being more likely than short met to bump their heads on the moon’ (89)
 * 9) Argues for an empirical approach to determining the breadth of a theory, rather than a deductive approach
 * 10) Even if researchers use RCT to arrive at their research questions, they should also explore alternative attempts to account for the phenomenon under consideration.
 * 11) ‘We are all for the development of more rather than less general theory in the social sciences, but any theoretical proposition worth having must be empirically sustainable. Given the current condition of theoretical knowledge in political science, our sense is that the most fruitful theory-building will remain in relatively close proximity both to the data and – in the quasi – Baysean sense mentioned earlier – to the existing knowledge about the phenomenon under study’ (95).
 * 12) ‘Collapsing bridges and self-fulfilling prophesies’
 * 13) Ordeshook (critic) says that...
 * 1) Conclusions.