Separation+of+Powers

** Summary by Suzanne Ghais Oct. 22, 2010 ** I. INTRO • Question: What’s the impact of separation of powers between executive and legislature in democracies? • Motivation: • Institutions have both symbolic and substantive importance • Scholars are now also interested in why some democracies collapse • [SG note: Primary method is deducing hypotheses from theory or expectations, then reviewing literature to see what’s been answered.] • Thesis (not exactly stated until the conclusion): the difference between presidential systems (i.e. separation of powers) and parliamentary systems has significant implications (though what those are, exactly, remains to be determined). II. DEFINITIONS Presidentialism v. parliamentarism • In presidentialism, pres is separately selected, but a prime minister (PM) is selected based on allocation of seats in parliament • Pres’ and legislators’ terms are fixed; PM’s and parliamentarians’ depend on mutual confidence • Pres system--separation between making laws and executing them [article not clear how these are fused in parliamentary system] • Pres controls the cabinet where a PM does not III. GOVERNMENT “DECISIVENESS/RESOLUTENESS” • We expect presidentialism to be “less decisive and more resolute” so policy change should be more difficult, slower, less dramatic, and more costly. • Presidential system allows more potential for executive-legislative deadlock. • Lots more research needed. IV. CABINETS: THE “MISSING LINK” IN THE STUDY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS • Topic of cabinets in pres systems has been neglected, esp. the question of the cabinet as the link between the pres and the legislature. • Parties’ decisions to enter or leave coalitions should be different in pres v. parliamentary systems because of the total control the pres has over the cabinet & ministries, potential coalition partners won’t see much hope for meaningful influence in a coalition gov’t. There is some research to confirm this. • To the extent a pres chooses to rely, or structurally must rely, on the legislatures to enact policies, pres is more likely to choose partisan cabinets (i.e. political party figures, as opposed to non-partisan technocrats) in proportion to the parties’ presence in the coalition. To the extent a pres relies on unilateral decree, cabinet seats “can be filled with non-partisan technocrats, cronies, or interest group representatives” (p. 711). Neto’s research confirms this. • What are the consequences of this? Neto’s research shows cabinet proportionality increases legislative success. Samuels argues this is because “When a proportional cabinet is formed, the president’s legislative coalition is more disciplined” [why??] (p. 713). • Further research should focus on how cabinets and coalitions are assembled as explanations for differences in governance. Research on cabinets is important not only because of the executive-legislative link but also because of cabinets’ control over the bureaucracy, which is very different in pres v. parl systems. • Because legislators in a pres system don’t control the bureaucracy, they should be more interested in detailed rules for the bureaucracy (re: implementation of laws). This has not been explored in the literature. • A key point: “the power to influence the cabinet is more fundamental to the policy process than any of the unilateral powers that many presidents possess” because of the lack of legislatures’ control over cabinet appointments (p. 714). V. REGIME CRISES: IS THE SEPARATION OF POWERS TO BLAME? • Regime collapse is more common in presidential systems. • This may be because “mutual dependence in a parliamentary system [e.g. either parl or PM can call for new elections] heightens the incentives for cross-branch negotiation” (p. 714). Prjeworski et. al confirm this. • However, research needs to address whether there is a legislative majority allied with or opposed to the president--the latter should lead to crisis or collapse. • Prjeworski et. al successfully refuted the idea that larger numbers of parties in the legislature lead to crisis/collapse. • Research should explore “the relationships between the size of the president's party and/or coalition, the distribution of portfolios in the president's cabinet, and the extent of ideological polarization in the legislature” (p. 716). • Hochstetler found that, in 10 South American countries, whether the pres has majority support in the legislature was an important factor in whether crises emerge (in this case, crises in which there were street protests pressuring presidents to step down). • Need to research--do such crises (as opposed to total collapse) occur more frequently in pres systems, and what are the consequences of such crises (good or bad). VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS, REPRESENTATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY • This question is the least well explored of all. • Author has hypothesized that “mandate representation [I don’t know what this means--maybe that the president was voted for by a majority??] will be less likely under presidentialism” (p. 720). • It’s been argued that proportional systems result in a closer match between government policy and popular preference, but that’s been tested mainly in parliamentary systems. • Similarly, research finding that simpler electoral & party systems help improve accountability (i.e., voters know whom to punish) has been mainly done on parl systems. • Research suggests votes for president and legislators are at different times, this can dilute accountability, but again that hasn’t been subjected comparative study. • In certain situations, voters attribute more responsibility for current conditions to executives than legislators if elections are simultaneous in pres systems; and more to legislative parties under pres systems than parl systems, countering claims that there’s more accountability in parl systems.
 * David Samuels, “Separation of Powers,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds., //The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics// (Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 29 **