The+Clash+of+Globalizations

He starts by briefly critiquing four previous attempts at this:
 * =Title= || Except from "Clash of Globalizations" (//Foreign Affairs//, 81:4, August 2002): 1-4. ||
 * =Author= || Stanley Hoffman ||
 * =Date= || August 2002 ||
 * =Summary By= || deRaismes and Eddy ||
 * =Summary= || Hoffman focuses on the globalized, post-9/11 world and how to conceptualize and make sense of it.
 * 1) **Fukuyama's** "End of History" thesis ignores the continued power of nationalism and religion.
 * 2) **Huntington's** "Clash of Civilizations" (need I say more??) -- but seriously, Huntington fails to clearly define what he means by civilization, making many of his assumptions and conclusions murky. He also ignores intra-civilizational conflict.
 * 3) **Realism** focuses too narrowly on security and state military power and cannot provide for change. Nor does it acknowledge the need for interstate cooperation with regard to WMDs. Terrorism also changes the game by forcing realists to question a state's sovereignty (of course, not their own sovereignty, but others that may be harboring terrorists).
 * 4) Thomas **Friedman's** "the world is flat" globalization paints far too rosy a picture of capitalism's drive for increased cooperation and the destruction of sovereign barriers, all the while promoting peace and democracy because both institutions promote economic growth.

Hoffman states that none of these models addresses 3 realities of contemporary globalization:
 * 1) State/great power rivalry still exists.
 * 2) While interstate wars might be on the decrease, intrastate wars are becoming more frequent.
 * 3) State foreign policies are shaped by realist interests (economics and military power) //as well as// domestic politics

He goes on to delineate 3 types of globalization:
 * 1) **Economic Globalization** (stems from tech innovation, information, trade, etc). However, this type of globalization promotes wealth at the expense of social justice and the incentive to address such large inequalities.
 * 2) **Cultural Globalization** (stems from increased flow of cultural goods). However this type (aka 'Americanization') breeds resentment against US hegemony/uniformity and fosters a growth in local cultures.
 * 3) **Political Globalization** (product of first two). Preponderance of US and its institutions as well as weaker international NGOs. He cautions that this type remains weak because of a lack of confidence that US hegemony will last.

Limitations of Globalization:
 * 1) Since globalization is an American creation, a large economic crisis in the US could have devastating global effects... (too true).
 * 2) Globalization's reach is limited because it ignores many poor countries
 * 3) International civil society remains embryonic
 * 4) Individual freedoms do not automatically nor quickly result once a state begins to democratize/integrate into the world market.
 * 5) Self-interest still dictates state policy -- therefore, the idealistic notion that a breakdown of barriers will improve the human condition is not borne out.

Effects of Globalization:
 * 1) Institutions favoring a 'global society' promoting justice, equality, fair trade, etc., run up against state interests NOT to constrain the market as well as states' interests not to have their sovereignty impeded. Hoffman suggests that there is often a bleak tradeoff between economic development/competitiveness and the preservation of social safety nets.
 * 2) Globalization has not really changed anyone's perception of national identity. Even the EU does not have a supra-national collective identity yet despite dilution of borders and shared currency.
 * 3) Globalization still promotes violence -- it breeds resentment and augments inequality that is currently feeding in to the spread of terrorism. Furthermore, fighting terrorism hampers economic growth, is largely unsuccessful, and challenges state sovereignty (as does terrorism).

Bottom line: Globalization is not all its cracked up to be... ||
 * =Discussion points= || I really liked Hoffman's article, probably because it was very clear and easy to understand. I wonder, however, if he is too soon to condemn globalization? Isn't it, after all, a relatively new development in the grand scope of world history?

I also like Hoffman's thinking about 9/11 as a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the way we (perhaps 'we' meaning just the West) engage with the rest of the world. It would be really interesting to read a similar article on globalization from the perspective of Spivak's subaltern, or Mohanty's two-thirds world person. I wonder if they would reach the same conclusions?

- Eddy's Section

As deRaismes already did a great job summarizing this article I will limit my contribution to some discussion points:

Historians often debate the issue of how much time needs to pass before we can gain a solid understanding of the historical context of an event. Some same as little as a few years, while others prefer as much as 50 years. How much does the immediacy of 9/11 in Hoffman's writing colour his interpretation of that event with respect to globalization? Now, with the benefit of almost a decade of separation, do the events of 9/11 appear in some way different? Has time changed how we perceive the importance of 9/11 (in a geopolitical sense, not as a human tragedy)? Is it truly a Kuhnian paradigm shift, or more of a dramatic representation of a broader trend? Perhaps given the US reaction to 9/11, the event has actually become an even more seminal event in international relations?

Turning to Hoffman's critique of globalization itself, I would point out some reservations I have about analysis:

Regarding economic globalization, is this force really that detrimental to social justice? Granted that working conditions in the developing world do not achieve the standards established in the West and globalization has brought greater income inequality. However, it has also brought greater absolute wealth to hundreds of millions of people. Take China as an example. Certainly wealth was more evenly distributed under Mao than it is today. However, simply put, prior to China entering the global economy, almost everyone was poor. Crop failures and bad agricultural policies led to the starvation of up to 60 million people during the Great Lead Forward. Such an event is unthinkable in today's China. This does not justify complacency in the face of inequality and issues of social justice (which abound in today's China), however, it is necessary to view economic globalization in proper historical context.

Finally, have the events of the past few months in the Middle East changed the perception of globalization? Aren't these revolutions a direct result of the technologies of globalization? In this light, perhaps globalization is not quite as "far from spreading peace" as Hoffman would lead us to believe. || = = = = = = = = = = = =

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