Critical+Theory

Ela Rossmiller (version #2 coming soon) ||
 * =Title= || "Critical Theory" ||
 * =Author= || Richard Devetak ||
 * =Date= || 2009 (but the first copyright for this particular chapter is 2001) ||
 * =Summary By= || Suzanne Ghais
 * =Summary= || Summary #1

(“CT” will be used in this summary to mean “critical theory” or “critical international theory.”) Thesis: CT has challenged “the fundamental ground on which the discipline of International Relations stands” in terms of both ontology and epistemology. Origins of CT: CT has a lineage that includes Kant, Hegel, and Marx. It looks for the possibility of change embedded in society. It takes issue with traditional theory in which the theorist must be a detached and value-free observer, and instead argues that knowledge is context-bound. Finally, it is concerned with human emancipation and eliminating domination. Most CT concerns itself with society generally, not with relations between or among states. However, there are people extending the work of CT into international, or—more appropriately here—//global// relations. Connection between knowledge and values in IR: “Traditional” theory assumes a value-free epistemology; similarly, “problem-solving” theory (Waltzian realism and neoliberal institutionalism being the highlighted examples) seeks to be judged by its //utility// and seeks to work within the world, with its power relations, as it is. CT seeks to understand the //origins// of this existing order and examines what possibilities of change are “immanent” within it. Whereas realism is “technical” and rationalism “practical”, revolutionism is “emancipatory” (to use Habermas’ descriptors); however, revolutionism, according to CT, takes insufficient account of how morals are “socially and historically produced” (154). CT’s reconstruction of historical materialism: CT seeks to understand the real world, with its relationships of domination and subordination, in order to understand the potential for emancipation in a grounded rather than utopian way. Realism accounts for the present (anarchic) order in terms only of self-helping, self-interested powers, ignoring economy, culture, and morality; Marxism accounts for the modern order through emphasis on capitalism, modes of production, and class relations, but it underestimates the roles of “the state, state-system, nationalism and war” on the present order and so it “cannot account for the principles and practices by which international relations move from power to order to emancipation” (157). So CT responds to both realism and Marxism: · Cox tried to do this with a “historical structures” approach that sees structures as socially constructed and examines the process of structural change and in particular how the state is a historical, social product. He examines (Gramscian) “hegemony” which tries to appeal to universal interests to disguise its domination, and seeks to understand “counter-hegemonic” social movements. · Habermas also disagreed with the overemphasis on capitalist production but extracted from Marxism the theory of social evolution and the //relations// part of Marx’s relations of production, believing in the importance of symbolic and communicative processes. · Linklater studies the “expansion and contraction of community” (163) as a function of four rationalization processes: (1) class/production/economy (Marx), (2) states/war/anarchy (realism), (3) international society/development of universal moral principles. The state is the vehicle whereby a community binds itself together and separates itself from others by processes of inclusion and exclusion. The concept of emancipation in CT: CT seeks to understand the conditions in which emancipation is possible. This draws from the enlightenment concept of freedom as “the removal of unnecessary, socially-created constraints” (166)—i.e., //autonomy//. However, emancipation is protected by //security//, or absence of threat. “Critical security studies” upended the realist assumptions that security emerged from control of the instruments of violence; in CT humans, not states, are the subjects of security, and security is interdependent—we cannot be secure at the expense of others. Hence //community// also is important. The state is not, in CT, the exclusive locus of community, and its particularistic form of community is too exclusive and limiting. Finally, discourse ethics addresses the difficulty of achieving universal emancipation in the face of tremendous pluralism and diversity. It does this by attempting to draw consensus from an inclusive process of dialogue in which participants’ articulating their viewpoints in a way others can understand.

Summary #2:

__Overview:__ This book chapter discusses the origins of critical theory in international relations, the relationship of knowledge to values in international relations, critical theory’s take on historical materialism, and critical theory’s concept of emancipation. 1. Origins of Critical Theory (p. 146-8) a. Inspirations of Critical Theorists: Kant, Hegel, Marx b. Key critical theorists: Horkeimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Fromm, Habermas, Lowenthal (Frankfurt School) c. Critical theorists generally seek to unmask society’s pathologies and contradictions in order to effect change. d. Critical theorists see knowledge as deriving from society, not as disconnected from society. 2. Knowledge and Values in International Relations Theory (p. 148-155) a. Whereas traditional, “scientific” international relations theory aims to exclude subjective considerations such as values (e.g. Waltz), critical theory says that theory is not objective and separate from the world, but is embedded in a social, cultural, political and historical context. b. Critical theorists critique traditional approach of “problem-solving,” arguing that it doesn’t challenge underlying structural forces or international order. It is too conservative, legitimizing the status quo. (p. 150) c. In contrast, critical theorists critique theories that legitimate oppresive structures and seek to create theory that can challenge injustices, liberate the oppressed, and change the world. 3. Critical Theory’s Take on Historical Materialism (p. 155-165) a. Need to analyze the world as it is before launching a critique. b. For critical theorists, this means that the object of analysis must also be analyzed in context. c. Additionally, analysis takes a two-pronged approach. Its goals are both empirical (“world as it is”) and normative (“world as it should be.”) d. Critical theorists may draw on realism or Marxism, but go beyond these, seeing them as too limited/reductionist in their exclusive focus on economics (Marx) or the state (realism). Need to look at history, total array or social relations, for example. e. Habermas’ reconstruction of Marxian historical materialism (p. 161-2): Agrees with Marx’ general idea of social evolution, but thinks M. is too reductionist. Habermas says we need to broaden the scope of analysis to include other types of rationalization processes (instrumental, strategic, and communicative or moral-practical). f. Linklater picks up on idea that we should look at a range of rationalization processes and identified several which formt he foundation of a critical theory approach. (p. 163) Wants to include analysis of class, production, and world economy. 4. Critical Theory and the Concept of Emancipation (p. 165 – 173) a. Emancipation = self-determination, autonomy, security. b. Traditional notions of security are problematized by critical theorists => “critical security studies” c. Questions states as idealized communities, primary actors in IR. Considers subnational and transnational entities. d. Seek to reconcile an acceptance of pluralism and desire for inclusivity with moral commitments grounded in specific communities. The solution? Discourse ethics => resolve conflicts without coercion. People in conflict enter the fray, discussing their values and beliefs in a way that others can understand and contest, and through ongoing discussion a consensus is ultimately reached. Draws upon Habermas. ||
 * Richard Devetak, //Critical Theory//**
 * =Discussion points= || Does critical theory build up as much as it tears down? While I shed no tears for the tearing down of IR realism, what is being built to replace it? This question is posed in terms of both an empirical research program and practical, policy implications. Critical theorists seem to be figuratively, and sometimes literally, the protestors shouting against domination by the powerful but lacking a tangible program to offer in its place.

Can scholarship in the CT tradition have an empirical component? What would be its methodology? With its interpretivist epistemology it would probably fit a range of qualitative methods. What questions would it pose? How would we evaluate the truth claims of its empirical findings?

What would policy informed by CT look like? How is universal emancipation possible in practice? Are third-party facilitation and inclusive dialogue the answers? How practical are these on a large scale? Is it just our failure of imagination that makes this sound utopian?

Critical theorists critique earlier scholars for being reductionist. How do you find the balance between explaining contexualizing phenomena and doing focused research? || = = = = = = = = = = = =

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