Objectivity+in+Social+Science+and+Science+Policy


 * =Title - Objectivity in Social Sciences and Science Policy= ||  ||
 * =Author - Weber= ||  ||
 * =Date= ||  ||
 * =Summary By - Efe and Caroline= ||  ||
 * =Summary=

EFE's SUMMARY **“Objectivity in Social Science and Science Policy" ** ** Summary:  **  When we study culture, it is usually in terms of the phenomena’s significance for us. We look at a part of concrete reality, which is interesting and significant to us. Therefore, nomological knowledge is not possible. The knowledge of causal laws is not the end but the means of knowledge. Also, the knowledge is the actually the knowledge of various aids used by our minds for attaining social reality.   Summary quote: “A systematic science of culture, even only in the sense of a definitive, objectively valid, systematic fixation of the problems which it should treat, would be senseless itself” (p.244) Gesetzesbegriffen: (System of) analytical laws Eigenart: (Significant in its) individuality Wertideen: evaluative ideas **  Discussion Points ** ** 1) **Given Weber’s ideas, what should we study in international relations? What makes an issue significant for a group of scholars?   ** 2)  **What should be our aim in our studies? What should we try to ‘know’? ** 3) **How should we define objectivity? (i.e. in terms of bias?)   ** 4)  **What is, then, the difference between social sciences and history? Weber seems to address both historians and scientists together. ** <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">5) **<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">How can we explain the existence of fields and subfields such as intercultural communication, crosscultural studies etc. given Weber’s account of ‘cultural sciences’?

CAROLINE's SUMMARY __<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Summary __<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">: <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In this commentary on how to approach social science, Weber warns that scholars should take care when claiming that their perspectives are objective. The difficulty with the social sciences is that objectivity is relative to “particular points of view” (244). <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The social science attempts to make the study of human behavior systematic and a “closed system of concepts.” This is impossible due to the constant ebb and flow of human interactions within and across cultures and due to the changing nature of academic inquiry (e.g. the shift to the scientific method). Weber argues that by claiming a single objective reality the result would “only produce a collection of numerous, specifically particularized, heterogeneous and disparate viewpoints in the light of which reality becomes "culture" through being significant in its unique character” (244). <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Despite his critique, in order to organize scholarly knowledge about the world, “historians”—his term for all social scientists—must be able to judge when their causal claims fit the cultural phenomena closely, and when they make too many imputations thus rendering their claims too general. Indeed, broad generalizations are meaningless not because cultural realities are random or unique but because, “social laws” are only a crutch for helping us simulate “social reality.” Furthermore, we can understand cultural events only as much as we recognize their significance within the “concrete constellations of reality.” Weber summarizes the paradox of academia’s attempt to understand “social reality:” <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">“Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance, are therefore worthwhile knowing” (242). __<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Discussion __<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">: <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">It seems like Weber is critiquing KKV // ex post facto //. Weber claims that “cultural science” has given itself the impossible task of explaining events in isolation, and yet he concedes that finding causal relationships between certain discrete historical phenomena is imperative. Where is the fine line between taking phenomena as part of the intricate “constellation” of social reality and as singular events? Where exactly is Weber’s fine line between enough and too much generalization? How would KKV respond? ||  || = = = = = = = = = = = =
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