Reconsiderations+of+Rational+Choice+in+Comparative+and+Historical+Analysis

Margaret Levi, “Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Marc I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., //Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure//, 2nd edition, (Cambridge UP, 2009), chap. 5, pp. 117-133. **Alternative Title:** Reviewing the Recent Development of Contemporary Comparative and Historical Rational Choice (CHRC) Theory **1.** **Introduction** 1.1. **Chapter goal**: To record sophistication in RC theory for comparative and historical analysis 1.2. **Preliminary definition of CHRC**: Pure RC theory does not fully explain individual action. CHRC is more in depth, taking into account context, institutional arrangements, structure, power, etc. CHRC (1) mixes and matches methods, (2) uses sophisticated tools e.g. game theory and experimentation, and (3) is more aware of the irrationality of the self and outside influences on identity and decisions. 2. **Recent advances in RC by comparativists** include using a multiple methods and/or schools e.g. rationalist/structuralist/culturalist, and considering endogeneity and defining causal mechanisms. Geddes criticized development theory in comparative politics as sloppy. Bates, Laitin and Ostrom combined empirical research with detailed analysis. North addressed the concept of change in rational choice over time. Keeping to the CP traditions of field work and interviewing is important while incorporating game theory, collective action theory and institutional analysis (see Bates 1998 book). 2.1. **Recent advances in time analysis:** Also in the past 10 years a major CHRC focus is the impact of events in the past on the present, building on path dependence theory as developed by economists Davis, Arthur and Pierson. Path dependence is the idea that the historical experiences of a person or institutions contribute to their decisions and history makes it more difficult to change and thus easier to predict choices. "The interactive processes among individuals and the design of institutions in which they interact raise the costs of changing norms, behaviors and relationships. The result is a relatively stable set of arrangements" (120). Time/historical analysis is also useful in understanding anomalies (“critical junctures”), e.g. revolutions (Weingast). 2.2. **Recent advances in multi method approaches:** Geddes’s work on the tension between generalization and in-depth analysis warns against research projects aiming for universal answers. Some very topic-specific studies (e.g. sewage in post revolutionary France) can tell a lot about theory. Given the increasing convergence of traditions, CHRC researchers are faced with adapting to multiple methods e.g. fieldwork, interviews, surveys, archival work, experiments, statistics, formal logic. Now, the old accusation that comparativists do not have enough evidence to support their claims is no longer true. Recent macro-historical work on conflict is bridging the gap between qualitative and quantitative. Others use large N data sets with in depth case studies. Within these theoretical and methodological trends, major work has been done e.g. on institutional change and variation, legislatures. **3.** **Comparative and historical analysis as a model of rational choice** 3.1. **Theoretical foundations:** RC came out of neoclassical economics, although it has been developed further by political scientists. RC differs from early public choice economists in that it investigates institutions and norms, the richness of context, conflict and power, and sometimes nonegoistic motivations (p.125). Sources of RC (all economists, 1950s and 60s) are: (1) spatial analysis (Black, Downs), on development of political institutions like federalism (2) social choice (Arrow), against the neoclassical RC claim that free will creates the most efficient/beneficial outcomes (3) collective action theory (Mancur Olson) for strategic decision making based on the knowledge of decisions by others (4) new economic institutionalism (Douglass North), investigating the relationship between transaction costs and relative bargaining power in the outcome of a decision **3.2.** **Components of the model:** (1) Assumption of rationality: There is debate about its definition, but usually along the lines of "individuals act consistently in relation to their preferences." (2) Constraints on behavior: (the most discussed aspect of the model) the 2 major constraints are scarcity of the individual's resources (e.g. money, the right to vote) and institutions/organizations (e.g. rules, sets of factors) (3) Strategic interaction and reaching equilibria: studying the conditions that lead to (or do not lead to) equilibria between two interacting parties and whether the equilibria reached is the most efficient (best) **4.** **Problems with the model** 4.1. **Weaknesses with the behavioral assumption of rationality:** Not everyone always acts out of pure self interest because they may not have all information, or info is filter/shaped by institutions, they may have a sense of fairness, extreme emotions or “cognitive limitations”. These constraints for the basis of Simon’s “bounded rationality.” **4.2.** **Power – it needs to be addressed**: Citing Moe as the main critic, Levi agrees and attributes this gap the "parsimony of game theoretic models in which only the primary actors of interest are modeled" (132). 5. **Conclusion:** Contemporary CHRC theory improves on its predecessors by collecting richer data and solving more complex problems. The next steps for CHRC are the implications of cognitive theory and networks for behavioral analysis and defining power. **A selection of CHRC definitions from the text:** p.122 “rational choice ensures that the research has microfoundations, that is, it pays attention to the constraints on and the strategic interactions among the actors whose aggregated choices produces the outcome of interest. However, the research enterprise itself usually involves some mix of fieldwork, interviews, surveys, archival work, experiments, and statistics in addition to formal logic. The sine qua non is an articulated model of rational action with testable implications that are then tested with the most appropriate forms of evidence.” p 123 "Comparative and historical rationalists are the beneficiaries of the transformation of area studies. It is no longer enough for a comparativist to be an expert on a place; she or he must also use that knowledge to ask larger social science questions." p.127 "empirical comparative and historical rational choice is based on the assumption that individuals are rational in the sense that they choose within constraints to abstain their desired ends and strategic in that these decisions rest on their assessment of the probably action of others." p.127 "the outcome depends on the aggregation of these individual actions."