Interest,+Habitus,+Rationality

There is a relationship between the habitus and the field, based on conditioning and cognitive construction. Because of this relationship, it would be easy to conflate the two. However, Bordieu says that if someone from one habitus were to be put into another field, they would behave strangely (or “irrationally”). Bordieu denies association with rational action theory (quite vehemently, I may add), but could we reconceptualize the notion of “habitus” into a thick rational choice theory? To what extent is the habitus shaped by individual agency? When challenging rational action theory, Bordieu downplays the role of individual agency, but when labeled a structuralist, Bordieu says that individual agency has a large part to play in shaping the habitus. Is he being inconsistent here? Why or why not? || = = = = = = = = = = = =
 * =Title= || "Interest, Habitus, Rationality" ||
 * =Author= || Bordieu and Wacquant ||
 * =Date= || 1992 ||
 * =Summary By= || Sonja ||
 * =Summary= || Wacquant interviews Bordieu and probes three of his terms: interest, habitus, and rationality.
 * Interest**: Bordieu’s concept of interest finds its roots in Weber’s principle that can be summarized as: “social agents obey a rule only insofar as their interest in following it outweighs their interest in overlooking it” (115). In other words, the concept of interest must take into account material, cultural, and historical factors if it is going to be useful. For Bordieu, this is useful when considering cultural producers, where he can identify interests as having a pointed and particular historic origin in a specified field. The opposites of this sort of interest are disinterestedness, gratuitousness, or indifference. While the word “interest” can be purported to have been imported from economics, however, Bordieu gives no credit to the economics discipline, as the definitions are his own.
 * Habitus**: Not to be confused with habit, the habitus is meant to account for the “actual logic of practice” (120) rather than the ideal logic of practice as exemplified in rational choice theory. It is, in brief, “an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences” (133). It acknowledges that objects are socially and historically constructed, as it is actually the makeup of a myriad of accumulations of choices (“practice in its humblest forms—rituals, matrimonial choices, the mundane economic conduct of everyday life” 121). We act out of our habitus, and our actions inform the habitus (in one sense, then, the habitus is meant to be a compromise within the structure-agent debate). Bordieu denies association with rational action theory or rational choice theory, insisting that those theories offer a too-narrow definition of “rationality.” One’s action, therefore, is a product of the socio-historical factors that precede the action. Accordingly, actions can only be interpreted ex post facto.
 * Rationality**: Bordieu prefers the word “reasonable” to the word “rational,” but essentially contests that rational choice and rational action theories do not take into account the preconditions to action. For Bordieu, individuals are indeed rational actors, but their rationality is only understood in the context of the habitus (or, if the habitus is in line with the field, in the context of both). ||
 * =Discussion points= || Does Bordieu make clear the relationship and distinction between the habitus and the field? If indeed in some cases, the habitus and the field are almost indistinguishable, do we need both terms?

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