The+War+Ledger

A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980), //The War Ledger//, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 13-63. **PART 1: In what ways is the distribution of power linked with the beginning of war?** I. Three models A. Balance of Power (BoP) 1. When power is more or less equally distributed among great powers or members of major alliances, there is peace. 2. Three main beliefs of BoP: a. Equality of power is conducive to peace b. An imbalance of power leads to war c. The stronger party is the likely aggressor 3. Assumes states are motivated by desire to maximize power 4. Mechanism of BoP is the making and unmaking of alliances (Reason for dependence on alliances: belief that a state’s power resources are inelastic) 5. The system is //homeostatic// – “ultrastable”: In maximizing own power postions, states group themselves in balances that tend to keep the system stable 6. Critique of BoP – do all states really want to maximize power? B. Collective Security (CS) 1. A lopsided distribution of power (with defenders much stronger than the aggressor) will support peace; while an equal distribution of power will mean war, but the aggressor will be weaker than the coalition 2. Three assumptions of CS: a. When serious dispute threatens outbreak of war, the identity of the aggressor is clear to all b. All states will be equally interested in preventing aggression and thus can be expected to affect policy to that end c. Alliances are the major method by which the necessary imbalance of power between aggressive and peaceful nations is to be effected C. Power Transition (PT) 1. Four assumptions a. An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of nations is likely to increase the probability of war b. Peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of state capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged states c. The aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries d. It is the weaker, rather than the stronger, power that is most likely to be the aggressor 2. Argues that the source of war is to be found in the differences in size and rates of growth of the members of the international system (Most important are economic productivity and the efficiency of the political system in extracting and aggregating human and material resources into pools available for state purposes) 3. Argues that the speed with which modernization occurs in big countries is also quite important in disturbing the preexisting equilibrium II. Comparison of three models A. Goals of elites (how or why do actors decide to keep the peace?) 1. **BoP** – Leaders of a state seek to maximize power, ie maximize individual utility: Strong states will do so by expanding, weak states will band together to protect themselves 2. **CS** – Leaders are motivated by rational desire to prevent (or defeat) aggression, ie maximize the utility of the system 3. **PT** – No general rule, but general dissatisfaction with own position in the system and a desire to refigure the rules that govern the relations between states, moves a country to war B. Mechanisms that redistribute power (how do power distributions lead to war?) 1. **BoP** **and** **CS** – changes in power distribution are the results of alliances 2. **PT** – changes in power distribution are the result of individual socioeconomic and political growth C. Power distribution 1. **CS** **and** **PT** – to preserve peace, power distribution must be lopsided in favor of defenders of the system and against the nations that wish to attack it 2. **BoP** – to preserve peace, there must be an equal distribution of power between major contesting sides **PART 2: How can we operationalize decisions of elites to fight a war?** I. Measurement of power resources A. Power = the capacity of an individual, group, or nation to control the behavior of others in accordance to its own ends B. Three steps: 1. List all factors that may serve as indicators of what influences the exercise of national power 2. Select the # of indicators considered important 3. Determine a way of aggregating the components in such a way as to obtain a single measure of national capability II. Alliance behavior and measurement of threat-perception A. Alliance behavior is taken to measure threat B. Four types of alliances rated on scale 1. Defense pacts (greatest commitment between states) 2. Mutual nonaggression pacts 3. Ententes 4. No alliance (least commitment) C. These relationships then scaled to reflect clusters of states with the greatest similarities and dissimilarities in their commitments (Fig. 1.1, p.41) III. Actors A. Elite nations stand out based on population, economic productivity, military strength (= US, UK, USSR/Russia, France, Japan, Germany, China, Italy, Austria-Hungary) B. States subdivided further into: 1. Central international system vs. Periphery (distinction indicated by alliances among actors) 2. Major powers vs. Contenders a. The most powerful state in world is always member of contending class b. Any other nation who scores 80%+ of the capabilities of top state is also a contender IV. Test cases: Total and major wars A. Major wars only occur if at least one great power fights on each side B. The conflicts selected must have battle deaths that were higher than any previous war C. The conflicts would result in loss of territory or population for the losing side D. Five such wars: Napoleonic, Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese War, WWI, and WWII (Napoleonic Wars discarded due to lack of data) V. Test periods and power distributions A. How much time needs to elapse either previous to or following the intersection of the power trajectories before conflict develops? – Decided on 20 years B. Compute power distributions by taking ratios of GNP for entire 20-year period for each pair of countries **PART 3: Test of the models to see which is correct** I. General test results: Which of the power distributions suggested by the three models actually happens before an outbreak of war? A. Findings point to PT 1. War is associated with shifts where one contender passes another in power 2. The speed with which the challenger overtakes the dominant nation is an important variable in governing the chances that the passage will be carried out in peace (ie, the faster, the more likely to be conflict) 3. Alliance commitments to other nations do not count for much with those that have the final say in initiating major wars, but they are critical in the case of major powers B. Destabilization and ensuing conflict between two main states acts as a magnet that draws in all the other major powers who are dependent on leaders for current and future gains C. Coalition of dominant state is stronger than coalition of challenger II. Evidence is NOT conclusive (small sample for test, thin results)