Power+Knowledge

Prepared by: Annie Gillman, 9/16/10 Abstract: This article is concerned with the changing way that power is exercised in modern society, and the ways that the creation of knowledge interacts with power. Foucault argues that what is valuable in knowledge creation in the last fifteen years is not grand overarching theories (like Marxism), but rather the emergence of forms //local criticism// that allow for the insurrection of //subjugated knowledge// which consist of a) historical studies (//erudite)//, and b) kinds of popular knowledge (//disqualified)//. Taken together, these two forms of knowledge reveal buried stories of struggle against power, which he calls //geneologies//. Power, he argues, is embedded in the very systems which consider which types of knowledge are valid or not, creating a“functionalist” or “systematizing” thought regime which is designed to mask the kinds of knowledge described above. Such power is not the kind of obvious, king rules and extracts resources, old school //sovereign power// that is easily recognizable. Rather, he argues that in the 18th century, a new type of //disciplinary power// has been invented by the bourgeois that acts through efficient systems of continued surveillance to extract time and labor from individuals—this seems to be a key element of capitalism. While this system is wholly incompatible with a system of sovereign power, the ideology and codified laws of sovereign power—and with them, the concept of rights—remain in order to mask this real power. · Foucault observes “a sense of th e incr e a s ing v ulnerabilit y to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourse s .” · This instability and vulnerability is not generated through //t// // ot //// alitarian the //// o //// ri //// es // (such as Marxism), which he thinks in fact have an inhibiting effect. “The attempt to think in terms of a totalit y has in fact pro v ed a hindrance to res e arch .” · Rather, it is created through the “amazing efficac y of dis c ontinuous, particular and local criti c ism, an autonomou s, non - centralised kind of theor e tic a l production , one that is to s a y w hose validit y i s not dependent on the appro v al of the es tablished r e gimes of thought.” In fact, he argues, the order imposed by “functionalist” and “systematizing” thought is designed to mask this knowledge. · Such local criticisms have proceeded by what he calls the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges.” By subjugated knowledges, he refers to: o “h i s t o ri c a l co n t e n ts th a t h a ve b ee n b u r i e d a nd d i sgu i se d in a f u n c t i o n a l i s t co her e nc e o r f o rm a l systemization ” (ex. Historical records of what actually went on in asylums). Because this can be scholarly and methodologically rigorous, he calls it //erudite//. o “a w h o l e s e t of kn ow l e dg es th a t h a ve b ee n d i s q u a li fi e d a s in a de q u at e to t h e i r t as k o r in s uf fi c i e n t l y e l a bor a t e d: n a i ve k now l e d g es, l oc at e d l o w d ow n o n the h i e r a r c h y, b e n ea th th e r e q u i r e d l e v e l o f c o g n iti o n or s c i e nt if i c i t y.” Also referred to as //popular knowledge// (ex. Knowledge of psychiatric patient, vs. that of article in medical journal). He refers to this as //disqualified// knowledge. · Both types of knowledges (erudite and disqualified) are concerned with //historical knowledge of strugqles//, as they hold “the memory of hostile encounters which even up t o t hi s da y h a ve be e n confin e d to the m a r g in s of k now l e d g e .” Foucault defines //gen// // e //// a //// l //// o //// gy // as “the u ni on o f e r ud it e k now l e dge a nd l oca l mem o ries w hi c h all ow s us to e st a bli s h a hi s t o ri ca l kn ow l e d g e of s t r ugg l es a n d to mak e u se o f thi s know l e dge t ac ti c al l y t o day.” · There is a certain power, he argues, embedded in the systematic and formal hierarchy of knowledge—in the fact that some knowledge is considered scientific, valid, and other is disqualified. As he puts it: “ What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: 'Is it a science'? Which speaking, discoursing subjects - which subjects of experience and knowledge - do you then want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct this discourse am conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist'? Which theoretical-political avant garde do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it?” · Such a //geneology,// then, serves to “entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order 'them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects....We are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society such as ours.” Or perhaps more clearly: “In contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse.” · The power he’s talking about, however, which is embedded in the very way that we consider what is valid or invalid knowledge is not the obvious power of the sovereign ruler, enacted upon subjects. Rather, he argues, since the 17th century there is a new type of //disciplinary power// that has emerged, “ possessed of highly specific procedural techniques, completely novel instruments, quite different apparatuses, and which is also, I believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty” · In contrast to //sovereign// power, such power: consists of a codification of a continuous surveillance, seeks the minimum expenditure for maximum return, extracts labor and time, rather than commodities and wealth (power over individuals, rather than materials), from individuals. It is “one of the great inventions of bourgeois society” and “has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment.” Moreover, it fundamentally lacks a system of rights that are inherent in sovereign power (and thus, he thinks, makes it more insidious and treacherous). · You would think this system of //disciplinary power//, then, would replace the ideology of //sovereign// power. Rather, however, sovereign power has not only persisted as an ideology, but continues to be the organizing principle in our legal codes. Why? To mask this real system of power! He notes, “ The theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights.”
 * Foucault: Power/Knowledge **