Dictatorship+Analytical+Approaches

(Summary by Sonja)
 * “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches”**
 * by Ronald Wintrobe**
 * Thesis:** There is convincing evidence that dictators are rational. Wintrobe surveys existing models that examine this possibility
 * Approach:** Rational choice (or economic)

· Dictator’s Dilemma (Wintrobe 1990, 1998): Rule by repression alone creates a problem. There is no way of knowing how much actual support one has. Dictators therefore also use loyalty. The variations of repression and loyalty produce four regime types: tinpots, tyrants, totalitarians, and timocrats · In the tinpot regime, the goal is to maximize consumption. Tinpot dictator will maintain the bare minimum of power necessary. They will set taxes not too high (people would complain), but not too low (the dictator wants money), and will keep people happy by offering an exchange for loyalty · In a totalitarian regime, dictator uses all possible means of repression and loyalty to maximize power. · The price of loyalty is therefore variable and under the dictator’s control. · A dictator either chooses to maximize consumption or power. · There is not strong evidence to support that increased repression or dissidence will increase the likelihood of revolution, until you introduce economic factors. Weak states will more likely support revolution. · Irony of Absolutism (North, Weingast, Root, etc.): The tradeoff between power and revenue. If you want to raise an army, you have to have money. You can’t get money unless you give up some power. · Additional questions: could repression have caused the Rwanda genocide? Does hate or fear determine the amount of repression needed? Does the extent to which people “buy in” have an effect?
 * Behavior of dictators**

· Dictator is a stationary bandit (Olson): There is economic incentive to be stationary and to tax minimally in order to grow the wealth of your subjects. If there is not a clear sense of who has power, dictatorship will devolve into democracy. o Two questions to ask: § What is the breadth of the ruler’s interest? § How long is the ruler’s interest? o Dictatorship is certainly superior to anarchy, but democracy is superior to dictatorship because democracy will best provide for the masses. · Democracies redistribute more than dictatorships (Toqueville) · Median voter model (Meltzer and Richards): the lower the income of the median voter relative to the mean income, the more redistribution would take place as a result of the electoral process (economic growth suffers) · There are advantages to dictatorship, because a dictatorship can suppress redistribution efforts. Democracies with low freedom can foster growth, whereas democracies with high freedom will stifle growth (Barro) · There is a positive relationship between democracy and economic freedom (De Haan and Sturm) · Endogenous shocks reduce economic growth under dictatorship, but not under democrary (Przeworski et al) · If a regime values the future, there will be growth (Robinson) · There is a “bifurcation point” above which the dictator will try to grow the economy as fast as possible, and below which the dictator will stop trying. · Toqueville hypothesis (through Lee): o If the poor have political (voting) power, taxes will be highter and redistribution will be more likely. o Higher taxes stunt growth o A less democratic regime logically could tax lower—the decisive voter is richer and wants lower taxes. BUT since the rich can exploit the poor, they will choose lower taxes anyway. · Problem with comparing democracy and dictatorship is that we often roll all dictators into one category, when in fact they are very diverse in character.
 * Democracy v. Dictatorship**

· Dictators do not operate solely on repression and demand, but also political exchange (political exchange perspective) · Dictatorships do repress. · It is not necessarily true that democracies redistribute more than dictatorships · Dictators rule with more support from the public than we give them credit for (and this reality is why some of our efforts to get dictators out of office has been unsuccessful).
 * Conclusion**