Politics+Among+Nations

** --Suzanne 9/16/10 ** Realism as a school of political thought stands in contrast to the other view that sees rational and moral world order as achievable now. Realism looks at human nature as it really is and argues you have to work with that, not wish it away. A good theory has to combine good reason with empirical validity, and realism does that. The fact that it’s based on very ancient thought isn’t a problem--indeed it supports it, because human nature hasn’t changed over time. Realism sees “interest defined in terms of power” meaning that politics can be studied autonomously from other things (such as economics where interest is defined as wealth). Incorrect to believe that policies flow predictably from motives/intentions or from ideologies. Interest defined as power provides a rational basis for political action, though real action deviates from that for a variety of reasons. Studying motives of leaders is futile for political studies because the actions are what count (and you can have good motives but bad consequences and v.v.); also you can’t deduce statesmen’s actions from their ideologies. Actions can deviate from the rational course for many reasons--e.g., one may act in habitual ways and fail to take into account new realities. The prevailing concepts of international relations—equal independent sovereign states—is at odds with the reality of interdependent and vastly unequal states. It’s a common mistake to trace problems to evil people, and to see their elimination as the solution. This “demonological” approach also leads people to downplay the real threat of power of other states. It also leads people to think no problems are insoluble, when some are. There’s a normative element to this theory—realism prescribes a rational foreign policy [based on balance of power?]: “Aware of the inevitable gap between good--that is, rational--foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of polical reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.” (p. 10) People are driven by their interests, and conflict v. harmony come from clashing v. similar interests. While “interest defined as power” is a universal and timeless concept the interests and the pursuit of power can differ widely. To the realist, pure morality per se is not relevant; the “supreme virtue” is “prudence” (p. 12) or the consequence of an action on political interests/power. Realism is against the idea that God is on “our” side. Realism contrasts with legalistic or moralistic approaches to international affairs. Real humans are multi-dimensional, not solely political, but it is possible to isolate the political (the pursuit of the interest in power) independently just as one can study the economic (the pursuit of the interest in wealth) independently. International politics can be studied as its own domain, distinct from, for instance, international law. Each occurrence is unique, yet we can look for patterns arising from common forces and the commonality of basic human nature. There is always uncertainty; “the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible” (p. 23), but one can identify the probabilities of different known tendencies. International politics is not going to be a perfect science--no social science (even economics with all its quantification) yields reliable predictions. The U.S. used to be able to consider its international relations as secondary to domestic politics, but no longer. Though powerful, it’s not too powerful to have to worry about its relative power in the world. Its status as powerful but not omnipotent makes it vulnerable. Plus the world has changed from Europe-centered to bipolar and global, and nuclear annihilation is now possible. Finally, “the preservation of peace has become the prime concern of all nations” (p. 27). “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (p. 31) though there are other elements to international relations (e.g., disaster relief). Power = “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men” (p. 32). Four key distinctions--Power v. influence: e.g., an advisor can have influence but not power to impose his will. Power v. force: the threat of force is inherent in politics but its use “signifies the abdication of political power in favor of military… power” (p. 33). Usable v. unusable power: the nuclear threat against a nuclear-armed enemy is cancelled out by the fear of reprisal, so it’s unusable. Legitimate v. illegitimate power--whether based on laws and morals. Legitimate power is “likely... more effective” (p. 34). Power involves control of the mind: “The political objective of war itself is not per se the conquest of territory and the annihilation of enemy armies, but a change in the mind of the enemy which will make him yield to the will of the victor” (p. 36) [I quoted that because this idea is where Jonathan Schell starts in his theory of nonviolence--but I digress.] When economic or military actions are taken for political rather than purely economic or military purposes, they must be judged by how they contribute to the nation’s power. International politics is power politics, yet some refuse to recognize that--they see it as a transient condition. The drive to dominate others is inherent in human nature. The “depreciation of political power” (p. 40) comes from two causes--the international relations philosophy, that saw only aristocratic power struggles as power and didn’t acknowledge the invisible power of economic or legalized dominance and subordination; and the particular U.S. relations to the world--the early U.S. divorced itself from European power politics. There is a “contemporary utopianism” or “science of peace” that takes as a premise the possibility of universal peace and cooperation and that sees science and reason as the routes to determining how this can be done. Interests in this view are ultimately reconcilable; conflicts are due to “ignorance and error” (p. 44), and are seen as technical problems to be solved rationally. Classical foreign-policy liberals search for the single cause of war (colonialism? secret treaties? capitalism?) in hopes of (scientifically) eliminating it, but the causes of war are many. The heyday of this school of thought was between the two world wars, with the pursuit of international organizations. This school of thought takes truth as the “supreme value” (p. 50), when in fact the supreme value of power is universal in international politics. Note: I read Morgenthau’s first chapter in a course I took earlier this year called “International Political Theory” taught by Jack Donnelly at Univ. of Denver. Here are some notes on what he said about Morgenthau: Morgenthau never challenges the idea that there are moral standards of right & wrong; just says these standards don’t apply in politics (similar to Niebuhr’s moral man, immoral groups). Morgenthau overstates; it’s not a clean, coherent model. He’s “a superb essayist but his essays don’t add up to anything” (prof. Donnelly). The way to read Morgenthau sympathetically is to focus on the __autonomy of politics__ as a separate domain in which the rules of morality do not apply (though he doesn’t explain why very well). So the national interest defined in terms of power is a standard. You expect national leaders to pursue national interest, even if they have to do something immoral.
 * Summary of Morgenthau (1985) for IR **
 * Ch. 1 **
 * Ch. 2 **
 * Ch. 3 **
 * ______ **