Rethinking+the+Public+Sphere+A+Contribution+to+the+Critique+of+Actually+Existing+Democracy


 * =Title= || Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy ||
 * =Author= || Nancy Fraser ||
 * =Date= || 1990 ||
 * =Summary By= || Efe ||
 * =Summary= || **Public sphere:** Body of private persons assembled to form a public. Also private persons coming together to discuss public issues.

(I just wanted to put this definition before the summary. Also let me give a //disclaimer// here: my reading of Habermasian public sphere was not very similar to Fraser's reading. For me, public sphere was practically a forum for discussion - which is not necessarily related to bourgeoisie ideals or to attempts to improve existing democracies. I read it as a descriptive analysis of how ideas and opinions about public policies are formed through communication (see pg.57). But I didn't see the distinctions created between state, markets, etc. I also thought Habermas answered the question of multiplicity of public spheres in the very same way she did. Especially his later works - which are written later than Fraser's article - on cosmopolitanism or surprisingly intelligible newspaper articles talk about institutional pluralism. Then again, I like to read Habermas out of context - as a research methods book than as a critical theoretical approach).

(Last note: If I were you, I would start reading this article from the conclusion. Actually read the first two paragraphs of the conclusion, skip the introduction, and it is easier to understand)

Fraser practically argues that Habermas's public sphere is not 'critical' enough to be labelled as a critical approach to democracy.

Firstly, she starts out explaining an alternative account of history (as Habermas's account focuses on early modern Europe, bourgeois society, the Enlightenment ideas etc. She uses Landes, Ryan, and Eley. I am going to skip this part in the summary as I believe it was not that important). Public sphere is an institution to rationalize political domination and to create a platform for discursive interaction. Habermas believes the ideal bourgeois public sphere was never realized as i)the separation of state, market, and society didn't happen and private interests were not excluded from the public discourse, ii) society was fragmented into different groups and classes, iii) welfare state caused state and society to come even closer.

The bourgeois masculinist conception of public sphere (this is pretty much Frasner's conclusion after the comparison of historical accounts) has four assumptions. And all of these assumptions impair the critical approach.

1) Social equality is not necessary for democracy as discursive practices in public spheres are open to everyone and promotes this egalitarian understanding. (a.k.a. intrapublic relations)

Habermas's public sphere claims to be open and accessible to all. But in reality, bourgeois practice reminds us (at least me) of Ancient Greece rather than contemporary Switzerland town halls. Race and gender were used to exclude individuals. Moreover, the discursive action within the public sphere 'was governed by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of status inequality" (p.63). So, even though bourgeois conception is wrong in assuming social inequality is unnecessary for participatory practices.

2) Multiple public spheres is a 'bad' thing for democracy. A single public sphere promotes democracy. (a.k.a. interpublic relations)

Habermas talks about 'the' public sphere (singular) (Really? - Efe's note). But if the society is stratified and there is no equal access, will it make sense to talk about democracy and the public sphere? Frasner talks about subaltern counterpublics (which is not that similar to Habermas's cosmopolitanism I guess) as parallel discursive arenas. She then compares and contrasts multiple spheres with a singular multicultural sphere. Given the fact that a public sphere is a platform for socialization with the functions of sustaining public discourse and creating identities, multiplicity of publics might be better in protecting democratic ideals. (And I believe this is what Habermas argues with cosmopolitanism - Efe's note)

3) Private interests should not be introduced to public sphere.

This understanding causes people to 'privatize' and 'economize' several issues to remove them from public agenda. The idea beyond public interests is the belief in a common good. So, only issues related to this common good should be discussed in public. However, this deduction causes exclusion (cf. civic-republican vs. liberal-individualist). She gives the example of wife-battering. (Actually her description of domestic violence seems to disprove her own point. I mean,when the issue was defined as domestic violence against women, it was a marginal 'private' issue. Yet, if you re-define it as domestic violence, you might include GLBT community into the discussion. And if you actually re-define the issue as violence, you might end up with a 'public issue'. The 'privacy' in this sense does not necessary refer to the walls of your house, it refers to the fact that it is related to a given group of people. If I am not -or anybody I care about- is not affected by domestic violence, why should I care? Then again, I believe I am totally misreading what she is saying - Efe's note)

4) Civil society and state should be separated.

If the civil society and state are separated, we have weak publics where non-state voices are only important in opinion forming. If they are not separated, non-state actors might be involved in decision-making stages as well. (Here of course we are not referring to state-controlled NGOs. It is about putting them in the same public sphere - Efe's note)

In conclusion, a really (reallllllllly) critical theory should i) render visible the ways in which social inequality taints deliberation within publics in late capitalist societies, ii) show how inequality affects relations among publics, iii) show how the overly weak character of some public sphere denudes public opinion of practical force.



I wound up writing myself a summary of this as I worked on my final exam, so here 'tis, in case anyone finds it helpful:
 * Suzanne's summary**

Habermas’ conception of the public sphere was beneficial in many ways. However, Fraser has several critiques. Revisions of his history of the bourgeois public sphere show the public sphere that emerged was more masculinized and “rational” and exclusive by gender. New public sphere also relied on class distinctions, from both aristocracy and lower classes; the new class valued women’s domesticity and a sharp public/private distinction. The irony is that “A discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction” (60) of this bourgeois class. Habermas “fails to examine other nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing public spheres” (60-61). “There were competing publics from the start” such as nationalist, peasant, elite women’s etc. publics (61) at odds with the bourgeois public. Thus Habermas’ public sphere was “a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule” (62) and a shift in the form of domination to one of constructed consent with some repression. All this calls into question 4 assumptions about the public sphere: 1. That it’s possible for participants to “bracket status differentials” (62). Not only was the bourgeois public sphere in fact exclusive of women and non-whites, but public discourse can involve subtler forms of domination (who speaks more, interrupts, etc.) even if formally equal. "Bracketing" the existence of dominance & subordination may serve to reinforce it. You need some measure of actual equality for liberal democracy: “participatory parity is essential to a democratic public sphere and ... rough socio-economic equality is a precondition of participatory parity” (74). 2. Normatively speaking, that a single public sphere is more democratic than a multiplicity of publics. In stratified societies, if there were only one public sphere, dominated groups would have no alternative arena in which to discuss their own needs, goals, etc. (a place to caucus, as it were –SG). With such spaces they’re still engaging with the public so it’s not “separatist.” They “help expand discursive space” (67). In an egalitarian, multicultural society, there can’t be a single comprehensive public sphere because “that would be tantamount to filtering diverse rhetorical and stylistic norms through a single, overarching lens” (69) because participation means speaking from within one’s own voice cultural identity, and there’s no cultural neutral. In principle you could still have enough shared values expressive norms, etc. for deliberating on issues of interest to all. 3. That discourse should concern the “public good” to the exclusion of private interests and issues. Habermas had private persons deliberating on public matters. If “public” means “of concern to everyone,” not all will agree what concerns everyone—e.g., domestic violence. “It follows that no topics should be ruled off limits in advance of such contestation” over what’s of public concern (71). If “public” means related to the common good (not private interests), then restricting deliberation to this means a “civic republican” model rather than a liberal-individualist one. This model is good in that it recognizes interests can be a product of deliberation rather than exogenously given, but it isn’t good to rule out expression of self interest; any consensus reached thereby is suspect especially where there is stratification. If "public" is defined as opposite of private property in an economic sense or private as in family/personal, this rules subjects out from debate, so that “even after women and workers have been formally licensed to participate, their participation may be hedged by conceptions of economic privacy and domestic privacy that delimit the scope of the debate” (73-74). 4. that a “democratic public sphere requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state” (63). If "civil society" just means “a privately-ordered, capitalist economy,” you need regulation and redistribution to achieve the equality necessary for democratic discourse. If "civil society" means associations that are non-gov’t, non-economic and non-administrative, “the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state” (75), then the desirability of keeping this sphere separate from the state seems at first to make sense. But the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty—“strong publics” (which can make decisions) as opposed to “weak publics” (public opinion)—blurred the line between civil society and the state. “[A]ny conception of the public sphere that requires a sharp separation between (associational) civil society and the state will be unable to imagine the forms of self-management, inter-public coordination, and political accountability that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society” (76). A good conception of the public sphere would thus “allow both for strong publics and for weak publics and… theorize the relations among them” (77). || = = = = = = = = = = = =
 * =Discussion points= || * [note--this is back to Efe now. --SG] How we should read Habermas will be my main discussion point. As I said above, I tend to take him out of context and he does have several interesting ideas. However, when you test the outcomes of his structural thinking (which tend to be highly idealist with a strong belief in humankind's capacity to use reason) with the history (which tend to be -well- real), the results are not encouraging. ||

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