Perspectives+on+Politics

Terry M. Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” //Perspectives on Politics// Vol. 3 No. 2 (June 2005): 215-232. **Synopsis:** Rational Choice Theory (RCT) often ignores the deeper implications of //power// by viewing political institutions as “structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned” (215). HOWEVER, Moe believes this paints an unrealistically //benign// portrait of RCT and necessitates a more balanced investigation of the different dynamics raised when power gets more central billing. Once power is accounted for, RCT becomes a better theory. Basic question being answered by RCT is: //How can individuals who are self-interested and opportunistic overcome their collective action problems to cooperate for mutual gain?// Answer: Create institutions that introduce rules and other structures where membership mitigates fears of collective action and provides benefits. Weingast says, “[individuals] often need institutions to help capture gains from cooperation” (217). **Power and Domestic Institutions:** Moe focuses on bureaucratic agencies as a representation of typical political institutions created through democratic politics under a constitutional framework. He states that it is easy to see that these institutions are often //not// cooperative or mutually beneficial for many of the people affected by them. Bureaucracies arise out of two founding and interrelated agreements: an agreement to form a coalition among legislators and interest groups; and a ‘principal-agent agreement’ among legislators and bureaucrats. These insiders get to impose their institutions on society as a whole. “Bureaucracies are institutions that are imposed by winners on losers, but they are also cooperative and mutually beneficial for the subset of actors who agree to their creation” (220). Alternative views: Lloyd Gruber’s argument: Some nations join international institutions because of a large imbalance of power, even though they expect to be worse off. For instance, if a regionally powerful state creates a multinational institution, weaker nations may join because the alternative is being shut out entirely. Gruber suggests that power can be hidden within ‘voluntary’ actions and could potentially negate the RCT belief that institutions are mutually beneficial for the insiders that willingly join them. Moe: In order to put power in a more central place in RCT thinking, we must address the potential definitions of power. Echoing Gruber, Moe gives the example of a criminal holding up a pedestrian with, “your money or your life.” He says that this is a form of “agenda control in which one actor denies the status quo to others in order to steer them into accepting alternatives more to his liking. … The outsiders cannot go back to the way things were. They must now choose from the power-constrained choice set and from that alone” (227). He also gives the inverse example of Actor A using his influence (power) to maintain the status quo by preventing Actor B from gaining access to alternatives where B would benefit. Moe ends by saying that other aspects of power (aside from coercion and force) are more fluid and difficult to pin down/define.
 * Basic Problems Associated with RCT:**
 * 1) Power is a peripheral component (where RCT is really a theory of cooperation)
 * 2) Because power is a fundamental concept in all IR work, RCT gives a false impression that it is being addressed on the same level as cooperation.
 * Institutions as Structures of Cooperation:**
 * 1) Whoever wins has the right to make decisions on behalf of everyone, and whoever loses is required by law to submit to the winners’ decisions.
 * 2) This means that any group with a substantial amount of //power// can “legitimately use public authority to impose bureaucratic institutions that are structurally stacked in their own favor” (218), making the losers worse off.
 * 1) Argument: (Based on Coasian models of economic exchange) When public policies and institutions help some interests and hurt others, they are still increasing the size of the overall pie, and the winners can compensate the losers through some sort of bargain.
 * 2) Problem: Such bargains typically involve large transaction costs and are difficult to arrange. (ie, can’t guarantee that any benefits will endure over time)
 * 3) Problem: Winners rarely voluntarily compensate losers.
 * 4) Argument: When policies are inefficient and don’t expand the pie (but shift resources in favor of one group, bargaining will lead to their rejection. (Problem: Same as a. above.)
 * 5) Argument: Democratically created institutions are socially contracted, so that even though groups may lose at certain decisions, ultimately they are better off than not having the democratic institution at all.
 * 6) Problem: According to Moe, Political systems are different than those typically used by economists in that the losers in private institutions can walk away. We are typically born into our political system and cannot just leave when we don’t like what’s going on.
 * 7) THEREFORE, the concept of a social contract doesn’t really apply.
 * Power:**
 * Power as coercion and force:**