Add: Fukuyama!

CRS Final Exam Prep
The State
Comp questions:
Evaluate the major theories of the state. Refer to specific books and authors.
Is the state the same in its essentials throughout the world? Compare and contrast how scholars of the state have answered this question. Be sure to cover two or three regions in the world in your selection of scholars to assess the extent to which the most prominent theories of the state are universal.
For decades scholars have predicted the demise of the state as the preeminent political institution for governance. Assess these arguments.
For decades, scholars have repeatedly predicted the demise of the state as the preeminent political institution of governance. Assess these arguments in light of the literature put forth by theorists on both sides of this debate.
In recent years, has state power become increasingly fluid? And in what respects are civil-society organizations (social movements) contesting the Weberian rationale of the state? To what extent have theorists explained this relationship? Which ones? What are the strengths and weaknesses of their work? (Steve told me that since we didn’t study civil society, this question won’t be used)
Are state formation and democratization inimical? Be sure to ground your answer in the literature of both subfields.
Indicate the ways in which varieties of capitalism and forms of the state relate to one another. What explains the uniformities and variation?
What is civil society? Discuss different conceptualizations of the term, and tie these conceptualizations to theories of democratization and the state. Is civil society always good? (see above)
Compare and contrast at least two prominent analytical constructions of the relationship between the state and society. Refer to specific books and authors, and the applicability to actual political processes. (see above)

Whereas some scholars contend that the Westphalian state is retreating or declining, others claim that it maintains its traditional roles and, as an actor, has not fundamentally changed. Trace and evaluate these arguments. With which author(s) do you agree? Why?


Main Topics and Authors (tailored specifically to the comp questions):

Major theories of the state
· Defining the state is difficult. Similarly, lots of people predict the demise of the state, partially because it is hard to verbalize exactly what the state does. Is it regulation, education, security, or something else?
· CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE:
o Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation: the state is the bureaucracy and administrative apparatus of the government, and maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. It maintains the distinction between the public and the private sector (in other words, the people and their property), and it is the guarantor of the rational-legal order (rule of law). The combination of these things determines whether a state is weak or strong, and also predicts state failure.
o Robert Dahl, Who Governs?: Pluralism--the state does not have much autonomy apart from the government. The state is the agent of the government.
o John Locke: The state is a contractual entity that the people enter into in order to ensure the distinction between their public and their private lives.
· THE STATE AS ARISING OUT OF WAR
o Charles Tilly, “War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime,” Bringing the State Back In (1985): Both war-making and state-making are “quintessential protection rackets,” but the state has the advantage of legitimacy. In early state-making, there was very little difference between banditry and state-controlled violence. The Lords would hire bandits to protect their own interests. Successful states emerged by successfully eliminating internal rivals, increasing the ability to extract resources, wage war, and protect its supporters.
§ The more costly the activity used in war, for example, the greater was the organizational need. War-making requires armies, navies, and supporting services. Forming a state produced control and surveillance within a territory.
§ Individual states became a network of states because
· Supplies were loaned and given to neighboring states for the purpose of war-making
· Competition for hegemony in a state increased war, muting the lines between war, state, and extraction
· Coalitions formed to force a particular state into a particular position.
· European argument. Doesn’t work for post-colonial states.
· THE STATE AS ARISING OUT OF ECONOMIC IMPETUS
o NEO-MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE:
§ Ralph Milleband: The state is the executive committee of the Bourgeoisie, and therefore maintains no autonomy. The state is therefore beholden to the capitalist interest of the country, except when there are divisions.
§ Nicos Poulantzas: Any social class can realize its power through the state apparatus. The state did have autonomy at one point, and can maintain that political autonomy if there is social or political deadlock.
§ Antonio Gramsci: The state constructs a hegemony, setting out social values that make it easier or harder for people to behave themselves. The state, therefore, maintains the social values of the bourgeois class, which cuts against the working class’ values. It is not just about who has absolute power, but more about who controls the social sphere and sets values.
o HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY OF THE STATE:
§ Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Asks the question of why some countries did better than others after the oil shock? Comes to the conclusion that countries with strong states that had a high degree of social centralization did better, because they were able to intervene quickly in pricing shocks (2x2 table: degree of state centralization v. degree of social centralization)
§ Robert H. Bates, “The Role of State in Development”: Draws from Douglass North’s assertion that the key to development is the creation of institutions because institutions deter people from making a profit if it harms others. The state is an institution necessary to development since it offers security, welfare, and provides protection. The state is therefore necessary to economic to development. The government can either extract wealth (and then there is no state) or provide for the creation of wealth (and then there is a state).
· CLASSICAL-PLUS THEORIES OF THE STATE:
o Spruyt “War, Trade, and State Formation,” The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics: Key features of the modern state are: a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (comes from Weber), emphasizing the warfare explanation; rationalized-legal administrations which legitimize the government; and the loyalties of the population within a fixed territorial space. The state, however, does not only arise from war, but also through economic incentive and ideation.
· CROSS-CULTURAL THEORIES OF THE STATE
o Clifford Geertz, Negara (1973): Asks the question of what the purpose of the state, following the case of eighteenth century Bali. Ultimately, he asserts that the purpose of the state is actually performance: to present a master narrative of what people want their society to be (question: is that true in the US today?).
o Spruyt, Hendrick, “War, Trade, and State Formation” (2007): Many states emerged “by fiat” rather than through warfare, and thus skipped the period in which European states fought for control of territory and thereby unified their populations. “The lack of frequent [interstate] conflict retarded the development of strong states in regions such as Africa.” Could be seen to explain the failure of the state in Africa—the state could not develop legitimacy.
o Tuong Vu, “Studying the State Through State Formation.” World Politics: Studying the state formation is important to understanding the enduring features of states. Compares cases across time and geographical location, extending beyond Europe and looking at Asian, African, and Latin American states.
§ Key feature of states: bureaucratic centralization. Why did states centralize? “War” Tilly. “More than war” –Ertman, Spruyt, Tin-bor Hui, Centeno). “Elite politics” –Adams, Gorski. “Administrative models, ideologies, economic factors, and colonial legacies” –Kohli, Herbst.
§ Democratic v. authoritarian states: the higher the bargaining power, the greater likelihood that the state will be democratic. If a ruler has to bargain with the elites, for example, the state will likely become democratic. We also shouldn’t throw blanket criticism over authoritarian states: some authoritarian states are protective and not predatory (Hui).
§ How can our concept of the state be improved? By admitting that states are not just material (military and bureaucracy) but also cultural (grounding legitimacy in religion, patriarchy, and other ideologies.
§ States are not autonomous actors nor causal variables, but the space in which people act in concert with one another.
o James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed (1998): The state is an apparatus which increases the order and legibility of its subjects. This role the state takes on results in a loss of local knowledge and an oversimplification of social processes. This was true in: pre-colonial Southeast Asia, Stalin’s “collectivization” of the countryside 1930-1934, Nyere’s “villiagization” in Tanzania 1973-1986, and Mengistu’s resettlement programs in Etheopia from 1985 on. The state, therefore, has a normative obligation to include local knowledge or METIS.
· OTHER NOTES: Spruyt mentions an ideation approach—groups begin to mimic each other and only those that conform to state ideals are deemed legitimate. We didn’t read an author that really emphasizes this so much, but I think you can offer Bates’s argument for this: “No state, no development” or cite post-colonial state formation.

Cultural context: Is the state the same throughout the world?

o No, the state is not the same throughout the world (obviously).
o Refer to the “cross-cultural” conceptions of the state (above), and also Bates’
“The Role of State in Development” to explain differences in economic development (to what degree is the state effective?)


The predicted demise of the state

o Arguments for the predicted demise of the state:
o Anthropological arguments:
§ Almond and Coleman (1960): Societies can offer security even if they lack states.
§ Gluckman (1955) Peace happens in the shadow of the feud. In other words, peace will naturally occur.
o International Relations arguments:
§ Keohane and Nye (1989): There may be no state at the global level, but there is order at that level and sometimes even peace.
§ The Folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986): People can play trigger strategies in repeated games even without social cohesion. A state is not necessary, therefore, for social cohesion.
o Anarchists (Taylor 1987) and libertarians (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) capitalize on the fact that people who do not possess states can be orderly.
§ Taylor: States are like gangs that have patrons. Patrons loot the state in order to provide goods to the clients. Patrons use the tax money to pay off people so they don’t get killed.
o James C. Scott (1998), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed: in its creation, the state eliminates local knowledge and oversimplifies social process. While this does not go so far as to predict the demise of the state, it does call for a reduced state.
o Considering that the rise of the state has been arguably Eurocentric, and that the state has been largely ineffective in post-colonial countries in which it has been imposed, the Eurocentric nature of the rise of the state could be seen to bring about the demise of the state.
o If the state came into being through war-making (Tilly), then is it really necessary any longer, when wars occur less and less between two states and more and more between nations/ethnic groups/auxiliary groups?
o Arguments against the predicted demise of the state:
o Bates: the anthropological argument does not take into account poverty, and poverty can result from statelessness
o Bates: the anarchic system and folk theorem cannot offer the same assurance to development as they do to IR.
o Bates: the state is necessary to development, because without it people live at a lower level of security, have to provide for their own protection, and have a decline in welfare. The price for disarmament in a family is having nothing worth stealing, which means great poverty.
o Clifford Geertz, Negara (1973): Asks the question of what the purpose of the state, following the case of eighteenth century Bali. Ultimately, he asserts that the purpose of the state is actually performance: to present a master narrative of what people want their society to be (question: is that true in the US today?). The state is therefore necessary to the fabric of society in some places.
o Frankly, scholars have been predicting the demise of the state for years, and it has not happened. Whether a state emerges for military, economic, or ideational reasons (Spruyt 2007), the fact is that states do emerge and seem to retain power.
o Weber: the government will always need to maintain a body that has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in order to promote peace.
o Locke: People need the state in order to maintain the separation between their public and their private lives.
o Neo-Marxist writers (Milleband, Poulantzas, Gramsci): The state is a necessary power that accompanies class struggle. Whether it is the executive committee of the Bourgeoisie, or whether it is the apparatus by which any class develops power, the state is an important part of class struggle, which moves the wheels of history, apparently.
o Katzenstein: The state is necessary to a government being able to respond and intervene quickly in exogenous shocks.

The fluidity of state power

o Weberian concept of the state: The state is the bureaucracy and administrative apparatus of the state, maintaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. It maintains the distinction between the public and private sectors, and is the guarantor of the rule of law.
o Has state power become increasingly fluid? I would say so, especially in recent years.
o It is difficult to say exactly what the role of the state is, considering that it has so many different functions. Is it a regulator? Does it provide education? Is it a record-keeper? Is it a policy machine? The very imprecision of the definition of the state indicates that power within the state has become increasingly fluid.
o Clifford Geertz, Negara (1973): Using the case of Bali, he holds that the state’s goal is performance: to present a master narrative of what people want their society to be. Is this not increasingly the case in the US, at least? Moreover, is this not increasingly the case in the EU? If so, then the state has shifted from simply “maintaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence” (Weber) to also holding a performance function.
o There is no doubt that the state has served particular functions at particular times in particular places. It has offered resources for rulers during times of war (Tilly), a space for economic (Milleband, Poulantzas), social (Gramsci), institutional (Bates) conflicts to be resolved, and a protection against exogenous shock (Katzenstein).
o Civil society organizations (social movements) contest the Weberian rationale of the state insofar as they play a role in some of the above functions of the state. In corporatist governments, for example, this certainly holds true (Williamson). Similarly, Putnam holds the civil society organizations play an important role in setting social standards and representing people’s interests.
o Where you could say that during original theory on state formation, the state wrested power from society, now civil society is wresting power from the state.
o Who discusses the intersection between the state and civil society? The line between the state and civil society is blurry, but one could say that they are at odds.
o Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (1995): Offers an analysis of the state and civil society in India. She holds that the state and civil society are consistently at odds with one another, and in India, the state’s actions created a docile or dormant civil society, unable to stand up to the state. She also holds that civil society is centrally propelled by communication and community, whereas the state is propelled by bureaucracy and authoritarianism. However, they should not been seen to be in opposition to one another, but rather as a dialectic—civil society can only be understood in light of the state (and only comes into scholarly consciousness when the state needs to be challenged).
o James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998): The state increases order and legitimacy of its subject, but there are many instances in which the state suffocates civil society in such a way that it cannot provide opposition to the state. The examples he gives are: pre-colonial Southeast Asia, Stalin’s “collectivization” of the countryside 1930-1934, Nyere’s “villiagization” in Tanzania 1973-1986, and Mengistu’s resettlement programs in Etheopia from 1985 on.
o Antonio Gramsci speaks to the intersection between the state and civil society, holding that the state sets the standard for social acceptability. The state, therefore, acts as the enforcer for the social values of the bourgeois class, cutting against the working class’ values (Prof. Silvia said that Gramsci was the best author to reference here, but to be honest I’m not sure how he discusses the intersection between the state and civil society).

The Westphalia State

o I would argue that the Westphalian state is a lot like the Weberian state—all about sovereignty and legitimacy. If the question is whether the Westphalian state has changed, the yes, I think it has. With increased international cooperation, the state has evolved and taken on new roles and new character: the state protects economic interests, the state is an instrument of performance, the state is not just material but also cultural, etc. See the above concepts of the state to discuss.

Capitalism v. forms of the state (similarities and differences)

(since I haven’t started looking at capitalism, I’m going to stick with talking about forms of the state here… hopefully something will emerge, and hopefully whoever is working on CPE North answers the other half of this question for me)
o Spruyt: how different processes of state formation favored the emergence of different regime types:
o Frequent and intense warfare create authoritarian regimes
o Land-based militaries are more likely to lead to authoritarian regimes than naval militaries
o Lots of money decreases the likelihood of absolutism
o High volumes of trade creates a strong urban base, so it is difficult to be a dictator
o Catch-up modernization from the top down creates authoritarianism
o Democratic regimes have an easier time mobilizing resources for war, but they are less likely to engage people in war because people would rather trade with them
o Snyder (2000): when authoritarian regimes face the prospect of being overthrown, they turn predatory. Democracy can therefore produce state failure.
o Bates: An equilibrium arises and the state forms when the government can gain a higher income by protecting the creation of wealth rather than engaging in its predation. With the process of not having future wealth, those with military capacity cannot count on future income, so they would rather protect creation of income.
o Hui (in Vu): Democratic v. authoritarian states: the higher the bargaining power, the greater likelihood that the state will be democratic. If a ruler has to bargain with the elites, for example, the state will likely become democratic. We also shouldn’t throw blanket criticism over authoritarian states: some authoritarian states are protective and not predatory
o Tilly: Capitalism and state-making are mutually reinforcing. The more costly the war-making activity, the greater organization that a state must maintain.
o War making yielded armies, navies, and supporting services
o State making produced durable instruments of control and surveillance within the territory
o Protection relied on the organization of war making and state making but added systems for those under protection to get their due, through courts and representative assemblies
o Extraction brought about fiscal accounting structures.
o Bates: No state, no development (see above, p. 2)
o Katzenstein: Stronger states are better able to deal with pricing shocks, and are therefore perhaps more friendly to capitalism?
o Neo-Marxist Arguments:
o Milleband: the state is the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, and is therefore beholden to its capitalist interest.
o Poulantzas: the state can be used by any social class to gain power, but it is most often coopted by the bourgeoisie.
o Gramsci: State controls the social sphere, and sets the value structure, which will most likely be capitalist.
o Locke: The state protects property and is therefore open to capitalism.

The rise of democratization v. the rise of the state (similarities and differences)

(again, I’m going to stick to answering the question of the rise of the state, in the hopes that whoever did democratization picks up the other half of this question)
THE RISE OF THE STATE:
o Tilly: The state arising out of war
o Economics
o Neo-Marxist Theory
§ Milleband
§ Poulantzas
§ Gramsci
o Institutionalist Theory
§ Katzenstein
§ Bates
o Spruyt: War, economics, and ideation. Also later by fiat, skipping the period of conflict (and thus increasing the instability of the state… same with democratization?)
o Geertz: State arising out of a need to present and maintain a master narrative
o Hui (in Vu): Democratic v. authoritarian states: the higher the bargaining power, the greater likelihood that the state will be democratic. If a ruler has to bargain with the elites, for example, the state will likely become democratic. We also shouldn’t throw blanket criticism over authoritarian states: some authoritarian states are protective and not predatory